no code implementations • ICML 2020 • Alexey Drutsa
We study learning algorithms that optimize revenue in repeated contextual posted-price auctions where a seller interacts with a single strategic buyer that seeks to maximize his cumulative discounted surplus.
no code implementations • ICML 2020 • Anton Zhiyanov, Alexey Drutsa
We are interested in learning algorithms that optimize revenue in repeated contextual posted-price auctions where a single seller faces a single strategic buyer.
no code implementations • NAACL 2021 • Alexey Drutsa, Dmitry Ustalov, Valentina Fedorova, Olga Megorskaya, Daria Baidakova
In this tutorial, we present a portion of unique industry experience in efficient natural language data annotation via crowdsourcing shared by both leading researchers and engineers from Yandex.
no code implementations • 24 Dec 2019 • Alexey Drutsa
We generalize to the finite-state case the notion of the extreme effect variable $Y$ that accumulates all the effect of a variant variable $V$ observed in changes of another variable $X$.
1 code implementation • NeurIPS 2019 • Arsenii Vanunts, Alexey Drutsa
We study revenue optimization pricing algorithms for repeated posted-price auctions where a seller interacts with a single strategic buyer that holds a fixed private valuation.
no code implementations • ICML 2020 • Alexey Drutsa
We study revenue optimization learning algorithms for repeated second-price auctions with reserve where a seller interacts with multiple strategic bidders each of which holds a fixed private valuation for a good and seeks to maximize his expected future cumulative discounted surplus.
no code implementations • 9 Jun 2019 • Nadezhda Bugakova, Valentina Fedorova, Gleb Gusev, Alexey Drutsa
Answers to pairwise tasks are known to be affected by the position of items on the screen, however, previous models for aggregation of pairwise comparisons do not focus on modeling such kind of biases.
no code implementations • ICML 2018 • Alexey Drutsa
We study revenue optimization learning algorithms for repeated posted-price auctions where a seller interacts with a single strategic buyer that holds a fixed private valuation for a good and seeks to maximize his cumulative discounted surplus.
no code implementations • 17 Jul 2017 • Alexey Drutsa
Finally, we generalize results on strategic regret previously known for geometric discounting of the buyer's surplus to discounting of other types, namely: the optimality of the pricing PRRFES to the case of geometrically concave decreasing discounting; and linear lower bound on the strategic regret of a wide range of horizon-independent weakly consistent algorithms to the case of arbitrary discounts.
no code implementations • 13 Dec 2016 • Alexey Drutsa, Andrey Shutovich, Philipp Pushnyakov, Evgeniy Krokhalyov, Gleb Gusev, Pavel Serdyukov
We develop a novel approach to build intent-aware user behavior models, which overcome these limitations and convert to quality metrics that better correlate with standard online metrics of user satisfaction.
1 code implementation • NeurIPS 2016 • Alexander Shishkin, Anastasia Bezzubtseva, Alexey Drutsa, Ilia Shishkov, Ekaterina Gladkikh, Gleb Gusev, Pavel Serdyukov
This study introduces a novel feature selection approach CMICOT, which is a further evolution of filter methods with sequential forward selection (SFS) whose scoring functions are based on conditional mutual information (MI).
no code implementations • 28 Nov 2016 • Alexey Drutsa, Gleb Gusev, Pavel Serdyukov
We investigate video popularity prediction based on features from three primary sources available for a typical operating company: first, the content hosting provider may deliver its data via its API, second, the operating company makes use of its own search and browsing logs, third, the company crawls information about embeds of a video and links to a video page from publicly available resources on the Web.