no code implementations • 3 Jan 2024 • Xuejian Li, Ze Wang, Bingqi Zhu, Fei He, Yongkang Wang, Xingxing Wang
The prevalent methods of segregating the ad auction and allocation into two distinct stages face two problems: 1) Ad auction does not consider externalities, such as the influence of actual display position and context on ad Click-Through Rate (CTR); 2) The ad allocation, which utilizes the auction-winning ad's payment to determine the display position dynamically, fails to maintain incentive compatibility (IC) for the advertisement.
no code implementations • 20 May 2022 • Guogang Liao, Xuejian Li, Ze Wang, Fan Yang, Muzhi Guan, Bingqi Zhu, Yongkang Wang, Xingxing Wang, Dong Wang
Although VCG-based multi-slot auctions (e. g., VCG, WVCG) make it theoretically possible to model global externalities (e. g., the order and positions of ads and so on), they lack an efficient balance of both revenue and social welfare.
no code implementations • 2 Apr 2022 • Ze Wang, Guogang Liao, Xiaowen Shi, Xiaoxu Wu, Chuheng Zhang, Bingqi Zhu, Yongkang Wang, Xingxing Wang, Dong Wang
Ads allocation, which involves allocating ads and organic items to limited slots in feed with the purpose of maximizing platform revenue, has become a research hotspot.