Search Results for author:
Found 4 papers, 1 papers with code
Participatory Budgeting With Multiple Degrees of Projects And Ranged Approval Votes
In this work, we let each project have a set of permissible costs, each reflecting a possible degree of sophistication of the project.
Characterization of Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences
We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences.
Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings
The specific, important, research gap that we address in this paper is to propose classes of rules for indivisible PB with weak rankings (i. e., weak ordinal preferences) and investigate their key algorithmic and axiomatic issues.
Maxmin Participatory Budgeting
Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a popular voting method by which a limited budget is divided among a set of projects, based on the preferences of voters over the projects.
Cannot find the paper you are looking for? You can
Submit a new open access paper.
