no code implementations • 1 Jan 2024 • Harry Pei
I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players can erase signals from their records.
no code implementations • 26 Aug 2023 • Harry Pei
A patient firm interacts with a sequence of consumers.
no code implementations • 6 Jul 2022 • Harry Pei
I analyze a novel reputation game between a patient seller and a sequence of myopic consumers, in which the consumers have limited memories and do not know the exact sequence of the seller's actions.
no code implementations • 5 Jan 2022 • Harry Pei, Maren Vairo
A buyer and a seller bargain over the price of an object.
no code implementations • 11 Dec 2021 • Harry Pei, Bruno Strulovici
We study whether a planner can robustly implement a state-contingent social choice function when (i) agents must incur a cost to learn the state and (ii) the planner faces uncertainty regarding agents' preferences over outcomes, information costs, and beliefs and higher-order beliefs about one another's payoffs.
no code implementations • 14 Dec 2020 • Yingkai Li, Harry Pei
We examine the long-term behavior of a Bayesian agent who has a misspecified belief about the time lag between actions and feedback, and learns about the payoff consequences of his actions over time.
no code implementations • 13 Nov 2020 • Drew Fudenberg, Ying Gao, Harry Pei
We analyze situations in which players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions.
no code implementations • 28 Jul 2020 • Yingkai Li, Harry Pei
We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents.
no code implementations • 29 Jun 2020 • Harry Pei
A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his myopic opponents' payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed action in every period.
no code implementations • 15 Jun 2020 • Harry Pei
I study a social learning model in which the object to learn is a strategic player's endogenous actions rather than an exogenous state.
