no code implementations • 27 Mar 2013 • Henry E. Kyburg Jr
A number of writers have supposed that for the full specification of belief, higher order probabilities are required.
no code implementations • 27 Mar 2013 • Henry E. Kyburg Jr
(la) So, relative to what I know, it is rational of me to believe S. (2) Now that I have more evidence, S may no longer be probable.
no code implementations • 27 Mar 2013 • Henry E. Kyburg Jr
A distinction is sometimes made between "statistical" and "subjective" probabilities.
no code implementations • 27 Mar 2013 • Henry E. Kyburg Jr
For many years, at least since McCarthy and Hayes (1969), writers have lamented, and attempted to compensate for, the alleged fact that we often do not have adequate statistical knowledge for governing the uncertainty of belief, for making uncertain inferences, and the like.
no code implementations • 27 Mar 2013 • Henry E. Kyburg Jr
One purpose -- quite a few thinkers would say the main purpose -- of seeking knowledge about the world is to enhance our ability to make good decisions.
no code implementations • 27 Mar 2013 • Henry E. Kyburg Jr
Uncertainty enters into human reasoning and inference in at least two ways.