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Optimal Auction Design with Flexible Royalty Payments
We study the design of an auction for a license.
Simple Proofs of the Variational and Multiple Priors Representations
This note gives simpler proofs of the variational and multiple priors representations in Maccheroni et al. (2006) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Benefiting from Bias: Delegating to Encourage Information Acquisition
A principal delegates decisions to a biased agent.
Quota Mechanisms: Robustness and Finite-Sample Performance
We establish a tight bound on the ex-post decision error under quota mechanisms, for a finite number of linked problems.
Bauer's Maximum Principle for Quasiconvex Functions
This note shows that in Bauer's maximum principle, the assumed convexity of the objective function can be relaxed to quasiconvexity.
Comment on Matsushima, Miyazaki, and Yagi (2010) "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information"
We correct a gap in the proof of Theorem 2 in Matsushima et al. (2010).
Should the Timing of Inspections be Predictable?
A principal hires an agent to work on a long-term project that culminates in a breakthrough or a breakdown.
Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future
I solve for the sender's optimal policy in closed form: the sender reports the value of the state with a delay that shrinks over time and eventually vanishes.
A Unified Theorem of the Alternative
This note presents a unified theorem of the alternative that explicitly allows for any combination of equality, componentwise inequality, weak dominance, strict dominance, and nonnegativity relations.
Content Filtering with Inattentive Information Consumers
We develop a model of content filtering as a game between the filter and the content consumer, where the latter incurs information costs for examining the content.
Comment on Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) "Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions"
The proof of their main theorem uses a different permutation-based definition, implicitly claiming that the permutation-version implies the bound-based version.
Scoring Strategic Agents
This rule underweights some features to deter sender distortion, and overweights other features so that the score is correct on average.
Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design
The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each test.
