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Found 10 papers, 2 papers with code
Thou Shalt not Pick all Items if Thou are First: of Strategyproof and Fair Picking Sequences
When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated agent chooses a given number of items (depending on her position in the sequence).
Multi-winner Approval Voting Goes Epistemic
Epistemic voting interprets votes as noisy signals about a ground truth.
Truth-tracking via Approval Voting: Size Matters
Epistemic social choice aims at unveiling a hidden ground truth given votes, which are interpreted as noisy signals about it.
Online Selection of Diverse Committees
Citizens' assemblies need to represent subpopulations according to their proportions in the general population.
Morphologic for knowledge dynamics: revision, fusion, abduction
Several tasks in artificial intelligence require to be able to find models about knowledge dynamics.
Proceedings Sixteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
This volume consists of papers presented at the Sixteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK) held at the University of Liverpool, UK, from July 24 to 26, 2017.
Agenda Separability in Judgment Aggregation
One of the better studied properties for operators in judgment aggregation is independence, which essentially dictates that the collective judgment on one issue should not depend on the individual judgments given on some other issue(s) in the same agenda.
Boolean Hedonic Games
The assumption of dichotomous preferences means that, additionally, each player's preference relation partitions the set of coalitions of which that player is a member into just two equivalence classes: satisfactory and unsatisfactory.
New Results on Equilibria in Strategic Candidacy
For four candidates, the message is, roughly, that most scoring rules (with the exception of Borda) do not guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium but that Condorcet-consistent rules, for an odd number of voters, do.
