no code implementations • 20 Feb 2024 • Federico Echenique, Joseph Root, Fedor Sandomirskiy
We study matching markets with aligned preferences and establish a connection between common design objectives -- stability, efficiency, and fairness -- and the theory of optimal transport.
no code implementations • 7 Sep 2023 • Joseph Root, David S. Ahn
We introduce a novel family of mechanisms for constrained allocation problems which we call local priority mechanisms.
no code implementations • 6 Sep 2023 • Yuliy Baryshnikov, Joseph Root
We give a new proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.
no code implementations • 30 Jan 2023 • Sophie Bade, Joseph Root
In either case, if this pair of agents is not matched together, each gets their top choice among the set of remaining agents.
no code implementations • 12 Mar 2022 • Federico Echenique, Joseph Root, Fedor Sandomirskiy
We study efficiency in general collective choice problems where agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed.
no code implementations • 11 Jun 2020 • Joseph Root, David S. Ahn
We give a related result for multiple assignment.