no code implementations • 13 Feb 2024 • Lee Cohen, Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi, Kevin Stangl, Ali Vakilian, Juba Ziani
We initiate the study of partial information release by the learner in strategic classification.
1 code implementation • 30 Jan 2024 • Krishna Acharya, Franziska Boenisch, Rakshit Naidu, Juba Ziani
DP requires to specify a uniform privacy level $\varepsilon$ that expresses the maximum privacy loss that each data point in the entire dataset is willing to tolerate.
no code implementations • 7 Oct 2023 • Krishna Acharya, Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Sampath Kannan, Aaron Roth, Juba Ziani
Our approach gives similar regret guarantees compared to [Blum & Lykouris]; however, we run in time linear in the number of groups, and are oracle-efficient in the hypothesis class.
no code implementations • 20 Jun 2023 • Yeojoon Youn, Zihao Hu, Juba Ziani, Jacob Abernethy
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that solely relies on randomized quantization without incorporating explicit discrete noise to achieve Renyi DP guarantees in Federated Learning systems.
no code implementations • 31 Jan 2023 • Lee Cohen, Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi, Kevin Stangl, Ali Vakilian, Juba Ziani
We initiate the study of strategic behavior in screening processes with multiple classifiers.
no code implementations • 1 Mar 2021 • Yahav Bechavod, Chara Podimata, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Juba Ziani
We initiate the study of the effects of non-transparency in decision rules on individuals' ability to improve in strategic learning settings.
1 code implementation • 12 Jun 2020 • Emily Diana, Travis Dick, Hadi Elzayn, Michael Kearns, Aaron Roth, Zachary Schutzman, Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi, Juba Ziani
We consider a variation on the classical finance problem of optimal portfolio design.
no code implementations • 17 Feb 2020 • Yahav Bechavod, Katrina Ligett, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Juba Ziani
We consider an online regression setting in which individuals adapt to the regression model: arriving individuals are aware of the current model, and invest strategically in modifying their own features so as to improve the predicted score that the current model assigns to them.
no code implementations • 16 Feb 2020 • Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Sampath Kannan, Aaron Roth, Juba Ziani
We consider two objectives: social welfare maximization, and a fairness-motivated maximin objective that seeks to maximize the value to the population (starting node) with the \emph{least} expected value.
no code implementations • 27 Aug 2018 • Sampath Kannan, Aaron Roth, Juba Ziani
We show that both goals can be achieved when the college does not report grades.
no code implementations • 10 Oct 2017 • Vasilis Syrgkanis, Elie Tamer, Juba Ziani
Given a sample of bids from independent auctions, this paper examines the question of inference on auction fundamentals (e. g. valuation distributions, welfare measures) under weak assumptions on information structure.