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Found 7 papers, 2 papers with code
On the Complexity of Rational Verification
To this end, we consider both utilitarian and egalitarian social welfare and show that computing such outcomes is either PSPACE-complete or NP-complete.
Rational Verification for Probabilistic Systems
Rational verification is the problem of determining which temporal logic properties will hold in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents in the system act rationally, by choosing strategies that collectively form a game-theoretic equilibrium.
Equilibrium Design for Concurrent Games
In particular, we consider system specifications given by LTL and GR(1) formulae, and show that implementing a mechanism to ensure that a given temporal logic property is satisfied on some/every Nash equilibrium of the game, whenever such a mechanism exists, can be done in PSPACE for LTL properties and in NP/$\Sigma^{P}_{2}$ for GR(1) specifications.
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning with Temporal Logic Specifications
In this paper, we study the problem of learning to satisfy temporal logic specifications with a group of agents in an unknown environment, which may exhibit probabilistic behaviour.
Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning
reinforcement-learning
+1
Automated Temporal Equilibrium Analysis: Verification and Synthesis of Multi-Player Games
In the context of multi-agent systems, the rational verification problem is concerned with checking which temporal logic properties will hold in a system when its constituent agents are assumed to behave rationally and strategically in pursuit of individual objectives.
Equilibria for Games with Combined Qualitative and Quantitative Objectives
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems.
Multi-Player Games with LDL Goals over Finite Traces
Linear Dynamic Logic on finite traces LDLf is a powerful logic for reasoning about the behaviour of concurrent and multi-agent systems.
