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Found 13 papers, 5 papers with code
Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models
This work identifies 18 foundational challenges in assuring the alignment and safety of large language models (LLMs).
Cooperation and Control in Delegation Games
Many settings of interest involving humans and machines -- from virtual personal assistants to autonomous vehicles -- can naturally be modelled as principals (humans) delegating to agents (machines), which then interact with each other on their principals' behalf.
Secret Collusion Among Generative AI Agents
In this paper, we comprehensively formalise the problem of secret collusion in systems of generative AI agents by drawing on relevant concepts from both the AI and security literature.
Visibility into AI Agents
Increased delegation of commercial, scientific, governmental, and personal activities to AI agents -- systems capable of pursuing complex goals with limited supervision -- may exacerbate existing societal risks and introduce new risks.
Welfare Diplomacy: Benchmarking Language Model Cooperation
The growing capabilities and increasingly widespread deployment of AI systems necessitate robust benchmarks for measuring their cooperative capabilities.
On Imperfect Recall in Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams
Multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) are a popular game-theoretic model based on Bayesian networks.
Reasoning about Causality in Games
Regarding question iii), we describe correspondences between causal games and other formalisms, and explain how causal games can be used to answer queries that other causal or game-theoretic models do not support.
Lexicographic Multi-Objective Reinforcement Learning
In this work we introduce reinforcement learning techniques for solving lexicographic multi-objective problems.
Multi-Objective Reinforcement Learning
reinforcement-learning
Bounded Robustness in Reinforcement Learning via Lexicographic Objectives
Policy robustness in Reinforcement Learning may not be desirable at any cost: the alterations caused by robustness requirements from otherwise optimal policies should be explainable, quantifiable and formally verifiable.
Rational Verification for Probabilistic Systems
Rational verification is the problem of determining which temporal logic properties will hold in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents in the system act rationally, by choosing strategies that collectively form a game-theoretic equilibrium.
Equilibrium Refinements for Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams: Theory and Practice
Multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) are a popular form of graphical model that, for certain classes of games, have been shown to offer key complexity and explainability advantages over traditional extensive form game (EFG) representations.
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning with Temporal Logic Specifications
In this paper, we study the problem of learning to satisfy temporal logic specifications with a group of agents in an unknown environment, which may exhibit probabilistic behaviour.
Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning
reinforcement-learning
+1
Learning Tractable Probabilistic Models for Moral Responsibility and Blame
From the viewpoint of such systems, the urgent questions are: (a) How can models of moral scenarios and blameworthiness be extracted and learnt automatically from data?
