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Found 17 papers, 0 papers with code
Call the Dentist! A (Con-)Cavity in the Value of Information
A natural way of quantifying the ``amount of information'' in decision problems yields a globally concave value for information.
Can One Hear the Shape of a Decision Problem?
We explore the connection between an agent's decision problem and her ranking of information structures.
Attraction Via Prices and Information
We study the ramifications of increased commitment power for information provision in an oligopolistic market with search frictions.
A More Informed Sender Benefits the Receiver When the Sender Has Transparent Motives
A sender with state-independent preferences (i. e., transparent motives) privately observes a signal about the state of the world before sending a message to a receiver, who subsequently takes an action.
Bayes = Blackwell, Almost
There are updating rules other than Bayes' law that render the value of information positive.
Comparison Shopping: Learning Before Buying From Duopolists
We explore a model of duopolistic competition in which consumers learn about the fit of each competitor's product.
Making Information More Valuable
We study what changes to an agent's decision problem increase her value for information.
Whose Bias?
Law enforcement acquires costly evidence with the aim of securing the conviction of a defendant, who is convicted if a decision-maker's belief exceeds a certain threshold.
Submission Fees in Risk-Taking Contests
This paper investigates stochastic continuous time contests with a twist: the designer requires that contest participants incur some cost to submit their entries.
Search and Competition with Flexible Investigations
We modify the standard model of price competition with horizontally differentiated products, imperfect information, and search frictions by allowing consumers to flexibly acquire information about a product's match value during their visits.
Persuasion Produces the (Diamond) Paradox
This paper extends the sequential search model of Wolinsky (1986) by allowing firms to choose how much match value information to disclose to visiting consumers.
Bayesian Elicitation
We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits.
Attraction versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets
We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer's visit will glean.
Probability Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics Economics
