Search Results for author:
Found 10 papers, 1 papers with code
Learning to Maximize Gains From Trade in Small Markets
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance.
Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination and Incentives
For additive valuations we present shares that are feasible, self-maximizing and polynomial-time computable.
Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis
We observe that this social inefficiency may be unbounded, and study whether alternative tax structures may lead to milder losses in the worst case, i. e. to a lower price of anarchy.
Making Auctions Robust to Aftermarkets
We show that when using balanced prices, both these approaches ensure high equilibrium welfare in the combined market.
Best-of-Both-Worlds Fair-Share Allocations
The up to one item paradigm fails to give such a guarantee, and it is not difficult to present examples in which previous BoBW mechanisms give agents only a $\frac{1}{n}$ fraction of their MMS.
Fairness
Computer Science and Game Theory
Submultiplicative Glivenko-Cantelli and Uniform Convergence of Revenues
In this work we derive a variant of the classic Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem, which asserts uniform convergence of the empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) to the CDF of the underlying distribution.
Bertrand Networks
We study scenarios where multiple sellers of a homogeneous good compete on prices, where each seller can only sell to some subset of the buyers.
Computer Science and Game Theory J.4; F.2.2
On Bitcoin and Red Balloons
Our solution is to augment the protocol with a scheme that rewards information propagation.
Computer Science and Game Theory
Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply
The performance guarantee for the same mechanism can be improved to $O(\sqrt{k} \log n)$, with a distribution-dependent constant, if $k/n$ is sufficiently small.
Characterizing Truthful Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms
We investigate how the design of multi-armed bandit algorithms is affected by the restriction that the resulting mechanism must be truthful.
