no code implementations • 14 Feb 2020 • Aurélie Beynier, Nicolas Maudet, Simon Rey, Parham Shams
Recently, the problem of allocating one resource per agent with initial endowments (house markets) has seen a renewed interest: indeed, while in the domain of strict preferences the Top Trading Cycle algorithm is known to be the only procedure guaranteeing Pareto-optimality, individual rationality, and strategy proofness.
no code implementations • 25 Nov 2019 • Parham Shams, Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret, Nicolas Maudet
Building on previous work by Parijs (who introduced "unanimous envy") we propose the notion of approval envy: an agent $a_i$ experiences approval envy towards $a_j$ if she is envious of $a_j$, and sufficiently many agents agree that this should be the case, from their own perspectives.
no code implementations • 24 Jun 2019 • Aurélie Beynier, Nicolas Maudet, Simon Rey, Parham Shams
We prove that in the single-peaked domain every swap-stable allocation is Pareto-optimal, showing the efficiency of the swap dynamics.