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Found 8 papers, 1 papers with code
Expected Frequency Matrices of Elections: Computation, Geometry, and Preference Learning
We use the ``map of elections'' approach of Szufa et al. (AAMAS-2020) to analyze several well-known vote distributions.
Bribery as a Measure of Candidate Success: Complexity Results for Approval-Based Multiwinner Rules
We study the problem of bribery in multiwinner elections, for the case where the voters cast approval ballots (i. e., sets of candidates they approve) and the bribery actions are limited to: adding an approval to a vote, deleting an approval from a vote, or moving an approval within a vote from one candidate to the other.
Algorithms for Destructive Shift Bribery
From the positive perspective we provide an efficient algorithm for solving the problem parameterized by the combined parameter the number of candidates and the maximum bribery price (alternatively the number of different bribery prices).
A Framework for Approval-based Budgeting Methods
We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational properties.
Complexity of Shift Bribery in Committee Elections
Given an election, a preferred candidate p, and a budget, the SHIFT BRIBERY problem asks whether p can win the election after shifting p higher in some voters' preference orders.
Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy
We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters, that is, we consider the parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections with respect to the number of voters as a parameter.
Finding a Collective Set of Items: From Proportional Multirepresentation to Group Recommendation
We consider the following problem: There is a set of items (e. g., movies) and a group of agents (e. g., passengers on a plane); each agent has some intrinsic utility for each of the items.
Achieving Fully Proportional Representation: Approximability Results
We study the complexity of (approximate) winner determination under the Monroe and Chamberlin--Courant multiwinner voting rules, which determine the set of representatives by optimizing the total (dis)satisfaction of the voters with their representatives.
