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Found 9 papers, 0 papers with code
Who's the Expert? On Multi-source Belief Change
A group of information sources gives a sequence of reports about the state of the world at various instances (e. g. different points in time).
Revision by Conditionals: From Hook to Arrow
The belief revision literature has largely focussed on the issue of how to revise one's beliefs in the light of information regarding matters of fact.
Elementary Iterated Revision and the Levi Identity
We close the paper by discussing the general prospects for defining iterated revision in terms of iterated contraction.
On Rational Entailment for Propositional Typicality Logic
Propositional Typicality Logic (PTL) is a recently proposed logic, obtained by enriching classical propositional logic with a typicality operator capturing the most typical (alias normal or conventional) situations in which a given sentence holds.
On Strengthening the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision: Proper Ordinal Interval Operators
In this paper, we supplement both the DP postulates and (P) with a number of novel conditions.
Extending the Harper Identity to Iterated Belief Change
The field of iterated belief change has focused mainly on revision, with the other main operator of AGM belief change theory, i. e. contraction, receiving relatively little attention.
Abduction and Dialogical Proof in Argumentation and Logic Programming
We develop a model of abduction in abstract argumentation, where changes to an argumentation framework act as hypotheses to explain the support of an observation.
Judgment Aggregation in Multi-Agent Argumentation
After characterising the sufficient and necessary conditions for satisfying collective rationality, we study whether restricting the domain of argument-wise plurality voting to classical semantics allows us to escape the impossibility result.
On the Link between Partial Meet, Kernel, and Infra Contraction and its Application to Horn Logic
The use of belief bases to obtain this result provides evidence for the conjecture that Horn belief change is best viewed as a hybrid version of belief set change and belief base change.
