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Found 5 papers, 1 papers with code
Let's Agree to Agree: Targeting Consensus for Incomplete Preferences through Majority Dynamics
We study settings in which agents with incomplete preferences need to make a collective decision.
An Optimal Procedure to Check Pareto-Optimality in House Markets with Single-Peaked Preferences
Recently, the problem of allocating one resource per agent with initial endowments (house markets) has seen a renewed interest: indeed, while in the domain of strict preferences the Top Trading Cycle algorithm is known to be the only procedure guaranteeing Pareto-optimality, individual rationality, and strategy proofness.
Almost Group Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Chores
We then present a clear taxonomy of the fairness concepts.
Swap Dynamics in Single-Peaked Housing Markets
We prove that in the single-peaked domain every swap-stable allocation is Pareto-optimal, showing the efficiency of the swap dynamics.
Efficiency, Sequenceability and Deal-Optimality in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods
This paper investigates these notions, when agents have additive preferences over objects, and unveils surprising connections between them, and with other efficiency and fairness notions.
