no code implementations • 21 Feb 2024 • Siyang Xiong
We prove that, if \r{ho} is monotonic, f can be implemented by a sequential-move game if and only if {\gamma}^{(\r{ho}, f)} is achievable, which translates a complicated mechanism design problem into checking some conditions defined on primitives.
no code implementations • 20 Sep 2023 • Seungjin Han, Siyang Xiong
In classical contract theory, we usually impose two assumptions: delegated contracts and perfect commitment.
no code implementations • 10 Nov 2022 • Siyang Xiong
We study Nash implementation by stochastic mechanisms, and provide a surprisingly simple full characterization, which is in sharp contrast to the classical, albeit complicated, full characterization in Moore and Repullo (1990).
no code implementations • 10 Feb 2022 • Siyang Xiong
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions, i. e., we offer a complete answer regarding what social choice functions can be rationalizably implemented.
no code implementations • 13 Oct 2021 • Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, Siyang Xiong
The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games which admit no equilibrium (Jackson (1992)).
