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Found 7 papers, 0 papers with code
Thou Shalt not Pick all Items if Thou are First: of Strategyproof and Fair Picking Sequences
When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated agent chooses a given number of items (depending on her position in the sequence).
A General Framework for the Logical Representation of Combinatorial Exchange Protocols
The contribution is two-fold: first, we illustrate the general dimension by representing different kinds of protocols, and second, we show how to reason about auction properties in this machine-processable language.
Multi-agent simulation of voter's behaviour
The goal of this paper is to simulate the voters behaviour given a voting method.
Fair in the Eyes of Others
Building on previous work by Parijs (who introduced "unanimous envy") we propose the notion of approval envy: an agent $a_i$ experiences approval envy towards $a_j$ if she is envious of $a_j$, and sufficiently many agents agree that this should be the case, from their own perspectives.
Chore division on a graph
We assume that these items are placed in the vertices of a graph and each agent's share has to form a connected subgraph of this graph.
Efficiency, Sequenceability and Deal-Optimality in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods
This paper investigates these notions, when agents have additive preferences over objects, and unveils surprising connections between them, and with other efficiency and fairness notions.
Efficiency and Sequenceability in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences
Finally, we investigate the links between these efficiency properties and the "scale of fairness" we have described in an earlier work [7]: we first show that an allocation can be envy-free and non-sequenceable, but that every competitive equilibrium with equal incomes is sequenceable.
