Reputation for Playing Mixed Actions: A Characterization Theorem

29 Jun 2020 Harry Pei

A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his myopic opponents' payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed action in every period. I characterize the set of environments under which the patient player obtains at least his commitment payoff in all equilibria regardless of his stage-game payoff function... (read more)

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