Virtuously Safe Reinforcement Learning

29 May 2018Henrik AslundEl Mahdi El MhamdiRachid GuerraouiAlexandre Maurer

We show that when a third party, the adversary, steps into the two-party setting (agent and operator) of safely interruptible reinforcement learning, a trade-off has to be made between the probability of following the optimal policy in the limit, and the probability of escaping a dangerous situation created by the adversary. So far, the work on safely interruptible agents has assumed a perfect perception of the agent about its environment (no adversary), and therefore implicitly set the second probability to zero, by explicitly seeking a value of one for the first probability... (read more)

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