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Found 9 papers, 1 papers with code
Pushing the Frontier on Approximate EFX Allocations
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha$-EFX).
AI-driven Prices for Externalities and Sustainability in Production Markets
Traditional competitive markets do not account for negative externalities; indirect costs that some participants impose on others, such as the cost of over-appropriating a common-pool resource (which diminishes future stock, and thus harvest, for everyone).
On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space.
Computer Science and Game Theory Computational Complexity
Putting Ridesharing to the Test: Efficient and Scalable Solutions and the Power of Dynamic Vehicle Relocation
We study the optimization of large-scale, real-time ridesharing systems and propose a modular design methodology, Component Algorithms for Ridesharing (CAR).
Rewarding High-Quality Data via Influence Functions
We consider a crowdsourcing data acquisition scenario, such as federated learning, where a Center collects data points from a set of rational Agents, with the aim of training a model.
Infochain: A Decentralized, Trustless and Transparent Oracle on Blockchain
For the first time, we show how to implement a trustless and transparent oracle in Ethereum.
Anytime Heuristic for Weighted Matching Through Altruism-Inspired Behavior
We present a novel anytime heuristic (ALMA), inspired by the human principle of altruism, for solving the assignment problem.
The Complexity of Splitting Necklaces and Bisecting Ham Sandwiches
We do this via a PPA-completeness result for an approximate version of the CONSENSUS-HALVING problem, strengthening our recent result that the problem is PPA-complete for inverse-exponential precision.
Reinforcement Mechanism Design for e-commerce
We study the problem of allocating impressions to sellers in e-commerce websites, such as Amazon, eBay or Taobao, aiming to maximize the total revenue generated by the platform.
