Search Results for author: Aurélie Beynier

Found 4 papers, 0 papers with code

An Optimal Procedure to Check Pareto-Optimality in House Markets with Single-Peaked Preferences

no code implementations14 Feb 2020 Aurélie Beynier, Nicolas Maudet, Simon Rey, Parham Shams

Recently, the problem of allocating one resource per agent with initial endowments (house markets) has seen a renewed interest: indeed, while in the domain of strict preferences the Top Trading Cycle algorithm is known to be the only procedure guaranteeing Pareto-optimality, individual rationality, and strategy proofness.

Fair in the Eyes of Others

no code implementations25 Nov 2019 Parham Shams, Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret, Nicolas Maudet

Building on previous work by Parijs (who introduced "unanimous envy") we propose the notion of approval envy: an agent $a_i$ experiences approval envy towards $a_j$ if she is envious of $a_j$, and sufficiently many agents agree that this should be the case, from their own perspectives.


Swap Dynamics in Single-Peaked Housing Markets

no code implementations24 Jun 2019 Aurélie Beynier, Nicolas Maudet, Simon Rey, Parham Shams

We prove that in the single-peaked domain every swap-stable allocation is Pareto-optimal, showing the efficiency of the swap dynamics.

Efficiency, Sequenceability and Deal-Optimality in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods

no code implementations28 Jul 2018 Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret, Michel Lemaître, Nicolas Maudet, Simon Rey

This paper investigates these notions, when agents have additive preferences over objects, and unveils surprising connections between them, and with other efficiency and fairness notions.


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