no code implementations • 18 Sep 2024 • Tobias Werner, Ivan Soraperra, Emilio Calvano, David C. Parkes, Iyad Rahwan
Conversational AI models are becoming increasingly popular and are about to replace traditional search engines for information retrieval and product discovery.
no code implementations • 25 Jul 2024 • Dima Ivanov, Paul Dütting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Tonghan Wang, David C. Parkes
We model the delegated task as an MDP, and study a stochastic game between the principal and agent where the principal learns what contracts to use, and the agent learns an MDP policy in response.
1 code implementation • 10 Jul 2024 • Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Di Wang, Manzil Zaheer, Aranyak Mehta, David C. Parkes
Revenue-optimal auction design is a challenging problem with significant theoretical and practical implications.
no code implementations • 11 Jun 2024 • Tonghan Wang, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes
This approach is general, leaving undisturbed trained menus that already satisfy menu compatibility and reducing to RochetNet for a single bidder.
1 code implementation • 21 Feb 2024 • Edwin Zhang, Sadie Zhao, Tonghan Wang, Safwan Hossain, Henry Gasztowtt, Stephan Zheng, David C. Parkes, Milind Tambe, YiLing Chen
Artificial Intelligence (AI) holds promise as a technology that can be used to improve government and economic policy-making.
no code implementations • 19 Feb 2024 • Luca D'Amico-Wong, Hugh Zhang, Marc Lanctot, David C. Parkes
We propose ABCs (Adaptive Branching through Child stationarity), a best-of-both-worlds algorithm combining Boltzmann Q-learning (BQL), a classic reinforcement learning algorithm for single-agent domains, and counterfactual regret minimization (CFR), a central algorithm for learning in multi-agent domains.
no code implementations • 14 Feb 2024 • Michael J. Curry, Zhou Fan, David C. Parkes
The role of a market maker is to simultaneously offer to buy and sell quantities of goods, often a financial asset such as a share, at specified prices.
no code implementations • 12 Feb 2024 • Jamelle Watson-Daniels, Flavio du Pin Calmon, Alexander D'Amour, Carol Long, David C. Parkes, Berk Ustun
And we characterize expected churn over model updates via the Rashomon set, pairing our analysis with empirical results on real-world datasets -- showing how our approach can be used to better anticipate, reduce, and avoid churn in consumer-facing applications.
no code implementations • 7 Feb 2024 • Safwan Hossain, Tonghan Wang, Tao Lin, YiLing Chen, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu
We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions.
no code implementations • 15 Sep 2023 • Hugh Zhang, David C. Parkes
We introduce SECToR (Self-Education via Chain-of-Thought Reasoning), a proof-of-concept demonstration that language models can teach themselves new skills using chain-of-thought reasoning.
1 code implementation • 3 Sep 2023 • Sara Fish, Paul Gölz, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Gili Rusak, Itai Shapira, Manuel Wüthrich
Traditionally, social choice theory has only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives but not to more complex decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement.
no code implementations • 8 Nov 2022 • Zhun Deng, He Sun, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Linjun Zhang, David C. Parkes
AI methods are used in societally important settings, ranging from credit to employment to housing, and it is crucial to provide fairness in regard to algorithmic decision making.
no code implementations • 19 Oct 2022 • Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes
Stackelberg equilibria arise naturally in a range of popular learning problems, such as in security games or indirect mechanism design, and have received increasing attention in the reinforcement learning literature.
Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning reinforcement-learning +2
1 code implementation • 24 Sep 2022 • Mira Finkelstein, Lucy Liu, Nitsan Levy Schlot, Yoav Kolumbus, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S. Rosenshein, Sarah Keren
This has given rise to a variety of approaches to explainability in RL that aim to reconcile discrepancies that may arise between the behavior of an agent and the behavior that is anticipated by an observer.
no code implementations • 2 Jun 2022 • Jamelle Watson-Daniels, David C. Parkes, Berk Ustun
We demonstrate the incidence and prevalence of predictive multiplicity in real-world tasks.
no code implementations • 15 Feb 2022 • Gianluca Brero, Nicolas Lepore, Eric Mibuari, David C. Parkes
Algorithmic pricing on online e-commerce platforms raises the concern of tacit collusion, where reinforcement learning algorithms learn to set collusive prices in a decentralized manner and through nothing more than profit feedback.
no code implementations • ICLR 2022 • Matthias Gerstgrasser, Rakshit Trivedi, David C. Parkes
Human demonstrations of video game play can serve as vital surrogate representations of real-world behaviors, access to which would facilitate rapid progress in several complex learning settings (e. g. behavior classification, imitation learning, offline RL etc.).
1 code implementation • 5 Aug 2021 • Stephan Zheng, Alexander Trott, Sunil Srinivasa, David C. Parkes, Richard Socher
Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations.
no code implementations • 7 Jul 2021 • Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott D. Kominers, David C. Parkes
What is of most interest is to use machine learning to understand the possibility of new tradeoffs between strategy-proofness and stability.
no code implementations • 2 Oct 2020 • Gianluca Brero, Alon Eden, Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes, Duncan Rheingans-Yoo
We introduce the use of reinforcement learning for indirect mechanisms, working with the existing class of sequential price mechanisms, which generalizes both serial dictatorship and posted price mechanisms and essentially characterizes all strongly obviously strategyproof mechanisms.
no code implementations • 26 Sep 2020 • He Sun, Zhun Deng, Hui Chen, David C. Parkes
We introduce the decision-aware time-series conditional generative adversarial network (DAT-CGAN) as a method for time-series generation.
no code implementations • 11 Sep 2020 • Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes
As an example, an attacker with 40% of the staking power is able to execute a 20-block malicious reorg at an average rate of once per day, and the attack probability increases super-linearly as the staking power grows beyond 40%.
Cryptography and Security
no code implementations • NeurIPS 2020 • Nir Rosenfeld, Sophie Hilgard, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, David C. Parkes
Machine learning is a powerful tool for predicting human-related outcomes, from credit scores to heart attack risks.
2 code implementations • 28 Apr 2020 • Stephan Zheng, Alexander Trott, Sunil Srinivasa, Nikhil Naik, Melvin Gruesbeck, David C. Parkes, Richard Socher
In experiments conducted on MTurk, an AI tax policy provides an equality-productivity trade-off that is similar to that provided by the Saez framework along with higher inverse-income weighted social welfare.
1 code implementation • 26 Mar 2020 • Rose E. Wang, Sarah A. Wu, James A. Evans, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, David C. Parkes, Max Kleiman-Weiner
Underlying the human ability to collaborate is theory-of-mind, the ability to infer the hidden mental states that drive others to act.
no code implementations • 28 Jan 2020 • Nir Rosenfeld, Aron Szanto, David C. Parkes
Recent work in the domain of misinformation detection has leveraged rich signals in the text and user identities associated with content on social media.
1 code implementation • NeurIPS 2019 • Jack Serrino, Max Kleiman-Weiner, David C. Parkes, Joshua B. Tenenbaum
Here we develop the DeepRole algorithm, a multi-agent reinforcement learning agent that we test on The Resistance: Avalon, the most popular hidden role game.
no code implementations • ICML 2020 • Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu
We prove that all three algorithms achieve a regret upper bound $\mathcal{O}(\max \{ B, K\ln T\})$ where $B$ is the total budget across arms, $K$ is the total number of arms and $T$ is length of the time horizon.
no code implementations • 30 May 2019 • Duncan Rheingans-Yoo, Scott Duke Kominers, Hongyao Ma, David C. Parkes
We study revenue-optimal pricing and driver compensation in ridesharing platforms when drivers have heterogeneous preferences over locations.
Multiagent Systems Computer Science and Game Theory
no code implementations • 29 May 2019 • Sophie Hilgard, Nir Rosenfeld, Mahzarin R. Banaji, Jack Cao, David C. Parkes
When machine predictors can achieve higher performance than the human decision-makers they support, improving the performance of human decision-makers is often conflated with improving machine accuracy.
no code implementations • 23 Jan 2019 • Goran Radanovic, Rati Devidze, David C. Parkes, Adish Singla
We consider a two-agent MDP framework where agents repeatedly solve a task in a collaborative setting.
no code implementations • 4 Jun 2018 • Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, David C. Parkes
The capacity constrained setting leads to a new strategic environment where a facility serves a subset of the population, which is endogenously determined by the ex-post Nash equilibrium of an induced subgame and is not directly controlled by the mechanism designer.
no code implementations • NeurIPS 2017 • Christos Dimitrakakis, David C. Parkes, Goran Radanovic, Paul Tylkin
We consider a two-player sequential game in which agents have the same reward function but may disagree on the transition probabilities of an underlying Markovian model of the world.
no code implementations • 6 Jul 2017 • Yang Liu, Goran Radanovic, Christos Dimitrakakis, Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes
In addition, we define the {\em fairness regret}, which corresponds to the degree to which an algorithm is not calibrated, where perfect calibration requires that the probability of selecting an arm is equal to the probability with which the arm has the best quality realization.
3 code implementations • 12 Jun 2017 • Paul Dütting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate task.
no code implementations • NeurIPS 2015 • Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes, Yaron Singer
We establish PAC learnability of influence functions for three common influence models, namely, the Linear Threshold (LT), Independent Cascade (IC) and Voter models, and present concrete sample complexity results in each case.
no code implementations • NeurIPS 2016 • Panagiotis, Toulis, David C. Parkes
Planned experiments are the gold standard in reliably comparing the causal effect of switching from a baseline policy to a new policy.
no code implementations • NeurIPS 2014 • Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia
In our framework, we are given a statistical ranking model, a decision space, and a loss function defined on (parameter, decision) pairs, and formulate social choice mechanisms as decision rules that minimize expected loss.
no code implementations • NeurIPS 2013 • James Y. Zou, Daniel J. Hsu, David C. Parkes, Ryan P. Adams
In many natural settings, the analysis goal is not to characterize a single data set in isolation, but rather to understand the difference between one set of observations and another.
no code implementations • NeurIPS 2013 • Hossein Azari Soufiani, William Chen, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia
In this paper we propose a class of efficient Generalized Method-of-Moments(GMM) algorithms for computing parameters of the Plackett-Luce model, where the data consists of full rankings over alternatives.
no code implementations • NeurIPS 2013 • Hossein Azari Soufiani, Hansheng Diao, Zhenyu Lai, David C. Parkes
We propose a model for demand estimation in multi-agent, differentiated product settings and present an estimation algorithm that uses reversible jump MCMC techniques to classify agents' types.
no code implementations • 26 Sep 2013 • Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia
We also prove uni-modality of the likelihood functions for a class of GRUMs.