Search Results for author: Erel Segal-haLevi

Found 10 papers, 5 papers with code

Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences

no code implementations24 Feb 2024 Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-haLevi, Warut Suksompong

For the case of two alternatives, we extend existing results by proving that under very general assumptions, the uniform phantom mechanism is the only strategyproof mechanism that satisfies proportionality - a minimal notion of fairness introduced by Freeman et al. (2021).


Balanced Donor Coordination

no code implementations17 May 2023 Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-haLevi, Warut Suksompong

Charity is typically done either by individual donors, who donate money to the charities that they support, or by centralized organizations such as governments or municipalities, which collect the individual contributions and distribute them among a set of charities.

Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited

no code implementations22 Jan 2023 Erel Segal-haLevi, Warut Suksompong

Cake cutting is a classic fair division problem, with the cake serving as a metaphor for a heterogeneous divisible resource.

Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing

1 code implementation5 Aug 2019 Fedor Sandomirskiy, Erel Segal-haLevi

We show that, for a generic instance of the problem (all instances except a zero-measure set of degenerate problems), a fair fractionally Pareto-optimal division with the smallest possible number of shared objects can be found in polynomial time, assuming that the number of agents is fixed.

Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics

Fairness for Multi-Self Agents

no code implementations16 Nov 2018 Sophie Bade, Erel Segal-haLevi

We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete and transitive ranking.


MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism

2 code implementations19 Dec 2017 Erel Segal-haLevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann

In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders.

Computer Science and Game Theory

Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods

2 code implementations8 Sep 2017 Erel Segal-haLevi, Warut Suksompong

We introduce the concept of democratic fairness, which aims to satisfy a certain fraction of the agents in each group.

Computer Science and Game Theory

Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences

1 code implementation22 May 2017 Erel Segal-haLevi, Haris Aziz, Avinatan Hassidim

We give a full characterization of allocations that are necessarily-proportional or possibly-proportional according to this assumption.

Computer Science and Game Theory

Competitive Equilibrium For Almost All Incomes: Existence and Fairness

1 code implementation11 May 2017 Erel Segal-haLevi

On the positive side, the paper proves that CE exists for almost all incomes when there are four goods and three agents with additive preferences.

Computer Science and Game Theory

Cannot find the paper you are looking for? You can Submit a new open access paper.