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Found 10 papers, 5 papers with code
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences
For the case of two alternatives, we extend existing results by proving that under very general assumptions, the uniform phantom mechanism is the only strategyproof mechanism that satisfies proportionality - a minimal notion of fairness introduced by Freeman et al. (2021).
Balanced Donor Coordination
Charity is typically done either by individual donors, who donate money to the charities that they support, or by centralized organizations such as governments or municipalities, which collect the individual contributions and distribute them among a set of charities.
Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited
Cake cutting is a classic fair division problem, with the cake serving as a metaphor for a heterogeneous divisible resource.
Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing
We show that, for a generic instance of the problem (all instances except a zero-measure set of degenerate problems), a fair fractionally Pareto-optimal division with the smallest possible number of shared objects can be found in polynomial time, assuming that the number of agents is fixed.
Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Fairness for Multi-Self Agents
We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete and transitive ranking.
MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders.
Computer Science and Game Theory
Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
We introduce the concept of democratic fairness, which aims to satisfy a certain fraction of the agents in each group.
Computer Science and Game Theory
Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences
We give a full characterization of allocations that are necessarily-proportional or possibly-proportional according to this assumption.
Computer Science and Game Theory
Competitive Equilibrium For Almost All Incomes: Existence and Fairness
On the positive side, the paper proves that CE exists for almost all incomes when there are four goods and three agents with additive preferences.
Computer Science and Game Theory
