no code implementations • 16 Mar 2020 • Jason Gaitonde, Eva Tardos
In this paper, we study this phenomenon in the context of a game modeling queuing systems: routers compete for servers, where packets that do not get service will be resent at future rounds, resulting in a system where the number of packets at each round depends on the success of the routers in the previous rounds.
no code implementations • 16 Mar 2020 • Jason Gaitonde, Jon Kleinberg, Eva Tardos
We study the connections between network structure, opinion dynamics, and an adversary's power to artificially induce disagreements.
Data Structures and Algorithms Computer Science and Game Theory Social and Information Networks Physics and Society
no code implementations • 23 May 2019 • Thodoris Lykouris, Eva Tardos, Drishti Wali
We study the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem with the graph-based feedback structure introduced by Mannor and Shamir.
no code implementations • 9 Nov 2017 • Thodoris Lykouris, Karthik Sridharan, Eva Tardos
We develop a black-box approach for such problems where the learner observes as feedback only losses of a subset of the actions that includes the selected action.
no code implementations • 26 Jul 2016 • Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings.
no code implementations • NeurIPS 2016 • Dylan J. Foster, Zhiyuan Li, Thodoris Lykouris, Karthik Sridharan, Eva Tardos
We show that learning algorithms satisfying a $\textit{low approximate regret}$ property experience fast convergence to approximate optimality in a large class of repeated games.
no code implementations • NeurIPS 2015 • Jason Hartline, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare.