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Found 12 papers, 1 papers with code
Protecting the Protected Group: Circumventing Harmful Fairness
In this family, we characterize conditions under which the fairness constraint helps the disadvantaged group.
Representative Committees of Peers
We show that a k-sortition (a random committee of k voters with the majority vote within the committee) leads to an outcome within the factor 1+O(1/k) of the optimal social cost for any number of voters n, any number of issues $m$, and any preference profile.
Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing
We show that, for a generic instance of the problem (all instances except a zero-measure set of degenerate problems), a fair fractionally Pareto-optimal division with the smallest possible number of shared objects can be found in polynomial time, assuming that the number of agents is fixed.
Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
On social networks that support learning
We illustrate the power of the local learning requirement by constructing a family of social networks that guarantee information aggregation despite that no agent is a social hub (in other words, there are no opinion leaders).
Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs
We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state, and who observe some information structure.
Private Private Information
A private private information structure delivers information about an unknown state while preserving privacy: An agent's signal contains information about the state but remains independent of others' sensitive or private information.
Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators
For one mediator, the characterization has a geometric meaning of constrained concavification of sender's utility, optimal persuasion requires the same number of signals as without mediators, and the presence of the mediator is never profitable for the sender.
Beckmann's approach to multi-item multi-bidder auctions
We consider the problem of revenue-maximizing Bayesian auction design with several bidders having independent private values over several items.
Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice
We study efficiency in general collective choice problems where agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed.
Persuasion as Transportation
We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with one informed sender and several uninformed receivers.
Decomposable Stochastic Choice
Each decision is modeled as a menu of actions with outcomes, and a stochastic choice rule assigns probabilities to actions based on the outcome profile.
Stable matching as transportation
We study matching markets with aligned preferences and establish a connection between common design objectives -- stability, efficiency, and fairness -- and the theory of optimal transport.
