Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness

no code implementations • 17 Sep 2021 • Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser

For Round-Robin we show that all of its pure Nash equilibria induce allocations that are EF1 with respect to the underlying true values, while for the algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden we show that the corresponding allocations not only are EFX but also satisfy maximin share fairness, something that is not true for this algorithm in the non-strategic setting!

Fairness

Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games

no code implementations • NeurIPS 2020 • Georgios Birmpas, Jiarui Gan, Alexandros Hollender, Francisco J. Marmolejo-Cossío, Ninad Rajgopal, Alexandros A. Voudouris

For this strategic behavior to be successful, the main challenge faced by the follower is to pinpoint the payoffs that would make the learning algorithm compute a commitment so that best responding to it maximizes the follower's utility, according to his true payoffs.