We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportional fairness.
Multi-robot task allocation is one of the most fundamental classes of problems in robotics and is crucial for various real-world robotic applications such as search, rescue and area exploration.
Rationing of healthcare resources has emerged as an important issue, which has been discussed by medical experts, policy-makers, and the general public.
Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
As a case study, we assume objects have priorities for agents and apply VER to sets of probabilistic allocations that are constrained by stability.
In this paper, we present a polynomial-time reduction to transform an instance of (1) to an instance of (2) and we show how the feasibility and stability of corresponding matchings are preserved under the reduction.
From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the corresponding optimization problem, where the goal is to locate facilities to minimize either the total cost to all agents or the maximum cost of any agent is NP-hard.
The capacity constrained setting leads to a new strategic environment where a facility serves a subset of the population, which is endogenously determined by the ex-post Nash equilibrium of an induced subgame and is not directly controlled by the mechanism designer.
Committee selection with diversity or distributional constraints is a ubiquitous problem.
We give a full characterization of allocations that are necessarily-proportional or possibly-proportional according to this assumption.
Computer Science and Game Theory
We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently.
Peer reviews, evaluations, and selections are a fundamental aspect of modern science.
The assumption of dichotomous preferences means that, additionally, each player's preference relation partitions the set of coalitions of which that player is a member into just two equivalence classes: satisfactory and unsatisfactory.
We focus on possible and necessary allocation problems, checking whether allocations of a given form occur in some or all mechanisms for several commonly used classes of sequential allocation mechanisms.
We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting.
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners.