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Found 31 papers, 3 papers with code
Nash Welfare and Facility Location
We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line.
Proportionally Representative Clustering
We propose a new axiom ``proportional representation fairness'' (PRF) that is designed for clustering problems where the selection of centroids reflects the distribution of data points and how tightly they are clustered together.
Proportional Fairness in Obnoxious Facility Location
On the other hand, in the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare.
Task Allocation using a Team of Robots
Task allocation using a team or coalition of robots is one of the most important problems in robotics, computer science, operational research, and artificial intelligence.
Random Rank: The One and Only Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Randomized Facility Location Mechanism
Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice.
Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules
In contrast to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, many of the rules we examined are not obviously manipulable.
Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location
We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness.
Multi-Robot Task Allocation -- Complexity and Approximation
Multi-robot task allocation is one of the most fundamental classes of problems in robotics and is crucial for various real-world robotic applications such as search, rescue and area exploration.
Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare Rationing
Rationing of healthcare resources has emerged as an important issue, which has been discussed by medical experts, policy-makers, and the general public.
Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
The Vigilant Eating Rule: A General Approach for Probabilistic Economic Design with Constraints
As a case study, we assume objects have priorities for agents and apply VER to sets of probabilistic allocations that are constrained by stability.
A characterization of proportionally representative committees
A well-known axiom for proportional representation is Proportionality of Solid Coalitions (PSC).
From Matching with Diversity Constraints to Matching with Regional Quotas
In this paper, we present a polynomial-time reduction to transform an instance of (1) to an instance of (2) and we show how the feasibility and stability of corresponding matchings are preserved under the reduction.
Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Perspectives
From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the corresponding optimization problem, where the goal is to locate facilities to minimize either the total cost to all agents or the maximum cost of any agent is NP-hard.
Almost Group Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Chores
We then present a clear taxonomy of the fairness concepts.
The Capacity Constrained Facility Location problem
The capacity constrained setting leads to a new strategic environment where a facility serves a subset of the population, which is endogenously determined by the ex-post Nash equilibrium of an induced subgame and is not directly controlled by the mechanism designer.
A Rule for Committee Selection with Soft Diversity Constraints
Committee selection with diversity or distributional constraints is a ubiquitous problem.
Computing and Testing Pareto Optimal Committees
Selecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an important problem in committee selection and beyond.
Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms
We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings.
The Expanding Approvals Rule: Improving Proportional Representation and Monotonicity
In view of this, our proposed rule seems to be a compelling solution for achieving proportional representation in voting settings.
Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences
We give a full characterization of allocations that are necessarily-proportional or possibly-proportional according to this assumption.
Computer Science and Game Theory
Computational Complexity of Testing Proportional Justified Representation
(2016) proposed an intermediate property called proportional justified representation that admits a polynomial-time algorithm to achieve.
Interdependent Scheduling Games
We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently.
Strategyproof Peer Selection using Randomization, Partitioning, and Apportionment
Peer reviews, evaluations, and selections are a fundamental aspect of modern science.
A Discrete and Bounded Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Any Number of Agents
We resolve the problem by proposing a discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for any number of agents.
Welfare of Sequential Allocation Mechanisms for Indivisible Goods
Sequential allocation is a simple and attractive mechanism for the allocation of indivisible goods.
Boolean Hedonic Games
The assumption of dichotomous preferences means that, additionally, each player's preference relation partitions the set of coalitions of which that player is a member into just two equivalence classes: satisfactory and unsatisfactory.
Online Fair Division: analysing a Food Bank problem
We study an online model of fair division designed to capture features of a real world charity problem.
Possible and Necessary Allocations via Sequential Mechanisms
We focus on possible and necessary allocation problems, checking whether allocations of a given form occur in some or all mechanisms for several commonly used classes of sequential allocation mechanisms.
A Study of Proxies for Shapley Allocations of Transport Costs
We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting.
Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners.
Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
The computational complexity of checking whether a fair assignment exists is studied for these fairness notions.
