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Found 8 papers, 0 papers with code
Pick-an-object Mechanisms
We justify the use of PAO as opposed to direct mechanisms by showing that its equilibrium behavior is closely related to the one in obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms, but implements commonly used rules, such as Gale-Shapley DA and top trading cycles, which are not OSP-implementable.
Assignment Maximization
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes.
Strategy-proof Popular Mechanisms
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed.
Hiring from a pool of workers
In many countries and institutions around the world, the hiring of workers is made through open competitions.
Designing Heaven's Will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service
We provide an original analysis of historical documents to describe the assignment procedures used to allocate entry-level civil service jobs in China from the tenth to the early twentieth century.
Incentive-compatible public transportation fares with random inspection
We consider the problem of designing prices for public transport where payment enforcing is done through random inspection of passengers' tickets as opposed to physically blocking their access.
Strategic Responses to Personalized Pricing and Demand for Privacy: An Experiment
We consider situations where consumers are aware that a statistical model determines the price of a product based on their observed behavior.
Racial and income-based affirmative action in higher education admissions: lessons from the Brazilian experience
This survey article provides insights regarding the future of affirmative action by analyzing the implementation methods and the empirical evidence on the use of placement quotas in the Brazilian higher education system.
