Our approach, which we call Adversarially Compounding Complexity by Editing Levels (ACCEL), seeks to constantly produce levels at the frontier of an agent's capabilities, resulting in curricula that start simple but become increasingly complex.
Furthermore, our theory suggests a highly counterintuitive improvement to PLR: by stopping the agent from updating its policy on uncurated levels (training on less data), we can improve the convergence to Nash equilibria.
We introduce an extension of the algorithm, other-play with tie-breaking, and prove that it is optimal in the LFC problem and an equilibrium in the LFC game.
Machine learning algorithms often make decisions on behalf of agents with varied and sometimes conflicting interests.
Recent work on promoting cooperation in multi-agent learning has resulted in many methods which successfully promote cooperation at the cost of becoming more vulnerable to exploitation by malicious actors.
We call our technique Protagonist Antagonist Induced Regret Environment Design (PAIRED).
However, this method cannot distinguish between the learned reward function failing to reflect user preferences and the policy optimization process failing to optimize the learned reward.
Deep reinforcement learning (RL) policies are known to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations to their observations, similar to adversarial examples for classifiers.