In this context, there is a more recently proposed formalism of may-must argumentation (MMA) that enforces still local but more abstract labelling conditions.
A negotiation process by 2 agents e1 and e2 can be interleaved by another negotiation process between, say, e1 and e3.
In this work, we contemplate a way of broadening it by accommodating may- and must- conditions for an argument to be accepted or rejected, as determined by the number(s) of rejected and accepted attacking arguments.
Abstract Persuasion Argumentation (APA) is a dynamic argumentation formalism that extends Dung argumentation with persuasion relations.
We contemplate a higher-level bipolar abstract argumentation for non-elementary arguments such as: X argues against Ys sincerity with the fact that Y has presented his argument to draw a conclusion C, by omitting other facts which would not have validated C. Argumentation involving such arguments requires us to potentially consider an argument as a coherent block of argumentation, i. e. an argument may itself be an argumentation.
Cycles of attacking arguments pose non-trivial issues in Dung style argumentation theory, apparent behavioural difference between odd and even length cycles being a notable one.
As is also commonly understood, however, a coalition may deliver benefits to a group X at the sacrifice of something that X was able to do before coalition formation, which X may be no longer able to do under the coalition.
In order that such situations can be also handled, we will enrich the latent belief theory with belief dependencies among attributive beliefs, recording the information as to which belief is supported of its existence by which beliefs.
Often, when we accept some information p, what is actually accepted is not the whole p, but only a portion of it; not necessarily because we select the portion but because p must be perceived.
In this work, I present gradual logic which materialises the observation that we cannot tell apart whether a so-regarded atomic entity is atomic or is just atomic enough not to be considered non-atomic.
This work inspects tacit agreements on assumptions about the relation between objects and their attributes, and studies a way of expressing them, presenting as the result what we term gradual logic in which the sense of truth gradually shifts.