no code implementations • ICML 2020 • Yuan Deng, Sébastien Lahaie, Vahab Mirrokni
Motivated by the repeated sale of online ads via auctions, optimal pricing in repeated auctions has attracted a large body of research.
no code implementations • 11 Jun 2020 • Zhe Feng, Sébastien Lahaie, Jon Schneider, Jinchao Ye
The display advertising industry has recently transitioned from second- to first-price auctions as its primary mechanism for ad allocation and pricing.
no code implementations • NeurIPS 2019 • Yuan Deng, Sébastien Lahaie, Vahab Mirrokni
Dynamic mechanisms offer powerful techniques to improve on both revenue and efficiency by linking sequential auctions using state information, but these techniques rely on exact distributional information of the buyers’ valuations (present and future), which limits their use in learning settings.
no code implementations • 4 Jun 2019 • Weiran Shen, Sébastien Lahaie, Renato Paes Leme
The problem of market clearing is to set a price for an item such that quantity demanded equals quantity supplied.
no code implementations • 14 Dec 2017 • Gianluca Brero, Sébastien Lahaie
We cast the problem of combinatorial auction design in a Bayesian framework in order to incorporate prior information into the auction process and minimize the number of rounds to convergence.
no code implementations • 9 Jun 2016 • Christian Kroer, Miroslav Dudík, Sébastien Lahaie, Sivaraman Balakrishnan
We present a new combinatorial market maker that operates arbitrage-free combinatorial prediction markets specified by integer programs.
no code implementations • 22 Feb 2014 • Jacob Abernethy, Sindhu Kutty, Sébastien Lahaie, Rahul Sami
We consider the design of prediction market mechanisms known as automated market makers.
