Search Results for author: Sylvain Bouveret

Found 7 papers, 0 papers with code

Thou Shalt not Pick all Items if Thou are First: of Strategyproof and Fair Picking Sequences

no code implementations11 Jan 2023 Sylvain Bouveret, Hugo Gilbert, Jérôme Lang, Guillaume Méroué

When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated agent chooses a given number of items (depending on her position in the sequence).

A General Framework for the Logical Representation of Combinatorial Exchange Protocols

no code implementations1 Feb 2021 Munyque Mittelmann, Sylvain Bouveret, Laurent Perrussel

The contribution is two-fold: first, we illustrate the general dimension by representing different kinds of protocols, and second, we show how to reason about auction properties in this machine-processable language.

Multi-agent simulation of voter's behaviour

no code implementations27 Jan 2021 Albin Soutif, Carole Adam, Sylvain Bouveret

The goal of this paper is to simulate the voters behaviour given a voting method.

Fair in the Eyes of Others

no code implementations25 Nov 2019 Parham Shams, Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret, Nicolas Maudet

Building on previous work by Parijs (who introduced "unanimous envy") we propose the notion of approval envy: an agent $a_i$ experiences approval envy towards $a_j$ if she is envious of $a_j$, and sufficiently many agents agree that this should be the case, from their own perspectives.


Chore division on a graph

no code implementations5 Dec 2018 Sylvain Bouveret, Katarína Cechlárová, Julien Lesca

We assume that these items are placed in the vertices of a graph and each agent's share has to form a connected subgraph of this graph.

Efficiency, Sequenceability and Deal-Optimality in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods

no code implementations28 Jul 2018 Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret, Michel Lemaître, Nicolas Maudet, Simon Rey

This paper investigates these notions, when agents have additive preferences over objects, and unveils surprising connections between them, and with other efficiency and fairness notions.


Efficiency and Sequenceability in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences

no code implementations6 Apr 2016 Sylvain Bouveret, Michel Lemaître

Finally, we investigate the links between these efficiency properties and the "scale of fairness" we have described in an earlier work [7]: we first show that an allocation can be envy-free and non-sequenceable, but that every competitive equilibrium with equal incomes is sequenceable.


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