Institutions and investors are constantly faced with the challenge of appropriately distributing endowments.
The mechanisms of emergence and evolution of collective behaviours in dynamical Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) of multiple interacting agents, with diverse behavioral strategies in co-presence, have been undergoing mathematical study via Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT).
In this paper, we study analytically the statistics of the number of equilibria in pairwise social dilemma evolutionary games with mutation where a game's payoff entries are random variables.
With the introduction of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and related technologies in our daily lives, fear and anxiety about their misuse as well as the hidden biases in their creation have led to a demand for regulation to address such issues.
Regulation of advanced technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become increasingly important, given the associated risks and apparent ethical issues.
The field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is going through a period of great expectations, introducing a certain level of anxiety in research, business and also policy.
Our analysis, both analytically and via numerical simulations, shows that whether prior commitment would be a viable evolutionary mechanism for enhancing coordination and the overall population social welfare strongly depends on the collective benefit and severity of competition, and more importantly, how asymmetric benefits are resolved in a commitment deal.
We argue that this cost is likely to be greater when the interaction is between people and intelligent agents, because of the reduced transparency of the agent.
As a consequence, different actors are urging to consider both the normative and social impact of these technological advancements.
The design of mechanisms that encourage pro-social behaviours in populations of self-regarding agents is recognised as a major theoretical challenge within several areas of social, life and engineering sciences.
Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems Social and Information Networks Theoretical Economics Physics and Society