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Found 12 papers, 2 papers with code
Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
We introduce the concept of democratic fairness, which aims to satisfy a certain fraction of the agents in each group.
Computer Science and Game Theory
Fairly Allocating Many Goods with Few Queries
For two agents with arbitrary monotonic utilities, we design an algorithm that computes an allocation satisfying envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), a relaxation of envy-freeness, using a logarithmic number of queries.
Weighted Envy-Freeness in Indivisible Item Allocation
We introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness concepts for agents with weights that quantify their entitlements in the allocation of indivisible items.
Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation
Schelling's model is an influential model that reveals how individual perceptions and incentives can lead to residential segregation.
Computer Science and Game Theory
Margin of Victory in Tournaments: Structural and Experimental Results
Tournament solutions are standard tools for identifying winners based on pairwise comparisons between competing alternatives.
Computer Science and Game Theory
On Maximum Weighted Nash Welfare for Binary Valuations
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights representing their entitlements.
A Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare for Indivisible Goods
In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) rule, which chooses an allocation maximizing the product of the agents' utilities, has received substantial attention for its fairness.
Extending the Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare
In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare rule has recently been characterized as the only rule within the class of additive welfarist rules that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good.
Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited
Cake cutting is a classic fair division problem, with the cake serving as a metaphor for a heterogeneous divisible resource.
Weighted Fair Division with Matroid-Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements.
Balanced Donor Coordination
Charity is typically done either by individual donors, who donate money to the charities that they support, or by centralized organizations such as governments or municipalities, which collect the individual contributions and distribute them among a set of charities.
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences
For the case of two alternatives, we extend existing results by proving that under very general assumptions, the uniform phantom mechanism is the only strategyproof mechanism that satisfies proportionality - a minimal notion of fairness introduced by Freeman et al. (2021).
