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Found 20 papers, 2 papers with code
On Separation Between Best-Iterate, Random-Iterate, and Last-Iterate Convergence of Learning in Games
Non-ergodic convergence of learning dynamics in games is widely studied recently because of its importance in both theory and practice.
On the Convergence of Min-Max Langevin Dynamics and Algorithm
We prove an exponential convergence guarantee for the mean-field min-max Langevin dynamics to compute the equilibrium distribution of the zero-sum game.
Provable Partially Observable Reinforcement Learning with Privileged Information
Partial observability of the underlying states generally presents significant challenges for reinforcement learning (RL).
Partially Observable Reinforcement Learning
reinforcement-learning
+2
COMAL: A Convergent Meta-Algorithm for Aligning LLMs with General Preferences
To achieve robust alignment with general preferences, we model the alignment problem as a two-player zero-sum game, where the Nash equilibrium policy guarantees a 50% win rate against any competing policy.
Fast Last-Iterate Convergence of Learning in Games Requires Forgetful Algorithms
While both algorithms enjoy $O(1/T)$ ergodic convergence to Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games, OMWU offers several advantages including logarithmic dependence on the size of the payoff matrix and $\widetilde{O}(1/T)$ convergence to coarse correlated equilibria even in general-sum games.
On Tractable $Φ$-Equilibria in Non-Concave Games
While Online Gradient Descent and other no-regret learning procedures are known to efficiently converge to a coarse correlated equilibrium in games where each agent's utility is concave in their own strategy, this is not the case when utilities are non-concave -- a common scenario in machine learning applications involving strategies parameterized by deep neural networks, or when agents' utilities are computed by neural networks, or both.
Multi-Scale Semantic Segmentation with Modified MBConv Blocks
Recently, MBConv blocks, initially designed for efficiency in resource-limited settings and later adapted for cutting-edge image classification performances, have demonstrated significant potential in image classification tasks.
Near-Optimal Policy Optimization for Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Games
In this paper, we improve both results significantly by providing an uncoupled policy optimization algorithm that attains a near-optimal $\tilde{O}(T^{-1})$ convergence rate for computing a correlated equilibrium.
Last-Iterate Convergence Properties of Regret-Matching Algorithms in Games
Despite their widespread use for solving real games, virtually nothing is known about their last-iterate convergence.
Curvature-Independent Last-Iterate Convergence for Games on Riemannian Manifolds
Numerous applications in machine learning and data analytics can be formulated as equilibrium computation over Riemannian manifolds.
User Response in Ad Auctions: An MDP Formulation of Long-Term Revenue Optimization
We characterize the optimal mechanism for this MDP as a Myerson's auction with a notion of modified virtual value, which relies on the value distribution of the advertiser, the current user state, and the future impact of showing the ad to the user.
Doubly Optimal No-Regret Learning in Monotone Games
We propose the accelerated optimistic gradient (AOG) algorithm, the first doubly optimal no-regret learning algorithm for smooth monotone games.
Accelerated Single-Call Methods for Constrained Min-Max Optimization
Finally, we show that the Reflected Gradient (RG) method, another single-call single-projection algorithm, has $O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}})$ last-iterate convergence rate for constrained convex-concave min-max optimization, answering an open problem of [Heish et al, 2019].
Accelerated Algorithms for Constrained Nonconvex-Nonconcave Min-Max Optimization and Comonotone Inclusion
In our first contribution, we extend the Extra Anchored Gradient (EAG) algorithm, originally proposed by Yoon and Ryu (2021) for unconstrained min-max optimization, to constrained comonotone min-max optimization and comonotone inclusion, achieving an optimal convergence rate of $O\left(\frac{1}{T}\right)$ among all first-order methods.
Tight Last-Iterate Convergence of the Extragradient and the Optimistic Gradient Descent-Ascent Algorithm for Constrained Monotone Variational Inequalities
We use the tangent residual (or a slight variation of the tangent residual) as the the potential function in our analysis of the extragradient algorithm (or the optimistic gradient descent-ascent algorithm) and prove that it is non-increasing between two consecutive iterates.
Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design
We propose a mechanism design framework for this setting, building on a recent robustification framework by Brustle et al., which disentangles the statistical challenge of estimating a multi-dimensional prior from the task of designing a good mechanism for it, and robustifies the performance of the latter against the estimation error of the former.
Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustness
When item values are sampled from more general graphical models, we combine our robustness theorem with novel sample complexity results for learning Markov Random Fields or Bayesian Networks in Prokhorov distance, which may be of independent interest.
Learning Safe Policies with Expert Guidance
We propose a framework for ensuring safe behavior of a reinforcement learning agent when the reward function may be difficult to specify.
Learning Multi-item Auctions with (or without) Samples
The second is a more general max-min learning setting that we introduce, where we are given "approximate distributions," and we seek to compute an auction whose revenue is approximately optimal simultaneously for all "true distributions" that are close to the given ones.
Optimum Statistical Estimation with Strategic Data Sources
We propose an optimum mechanism for providing monetary incentives to the data sources of a statistical estimator such as linear regression, so that high quality data is provided at low cost, in the sense that the sum of payments and estimation error is minimized.
