no code implementations • 11 Jun 2024 • Yunxuan Ma, Yide Bian, Hao Xu, Weitao Yang, Jingshu Zhao, Zhijian Duan, Feng Wang, Xiaotie Deng
Motivated by this, our paper investigates the computation of market equilibrium in scenarios with a large-scale buyer population, where buyers and goods are represented by their contexts.
no code implementations • 19 Feb 2024 • Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Yichong Xia, Siqiang Wang, Zhilin Zhang, Chuan Yu, Jian Xu, Bo Zheng, Xiaotie Deng
Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design.
no code implementations • 18 Dec 2023 • Hanyu Li, Wenhan Huang, Zhijian Duan, David Henry Mguni, Kun Shao, Jun Wang, Xiaotie Deng
This paper reviews various algorithms computing the Nash equilibrium and its approximation solutions in finite normal-form games from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.
no code implementations • 13 Jun 2023 • Yurong Chen, Qian Wang, Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Zhaohua Chen, Xiang Yan, Xiaotie Deng
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.
2 code implementations • NeurIPS 2023 • Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng
AMenuNet is always DSIC and individually rational (IR) due to the properties of AMAs, and it enhances scalability by generating candidate allocations through a neural network.
no code implementations • 27 Jan 2023 • Zhijian Duan, Yunxuan Ma, Xiaotie Deng
Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations.
1 code implementation • 29 Jan 2022 • Zhijian Duan, Jingwu Tang, Yutong Yin, Zhe Feng, Xiang Yan, Manzil Zaheer, Xiaotie Deng
One of the central problems in auction design is developing an incentive-compatible mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's expected revenue.
no code implementations • 17 Aug 2021 • Zhijian Duan, Wenhan Huang, Dinghuai Zhang, Yali Du, Jun Wang, Yaodong Yang, Xiaotie Deng
In this paper, we investigate the learnability of the function approximator that approximates Nash equilibrium (NE) for games generated from a distribution.
1 code implementation • ICLR 2020 • Jie Fu, Xue Geng, Zhijian Duan, Bohan Zhuang, Xingdi Yuan, Adam Trischler, Jie Lin, Chris Pal, Hao Dong
To our knowledge, existing methods overlook the fact that although the student absorbs extra knowledge from the teacher, both models share the same input data -- and this data is the only medium by which the teacher's knowledge can be demonstrated.
2 code implementations • 22 Jun 2019 • Weiping Song, Zhijian Duan, Ziqing Yang, Hao Zhu, Ming Zhang, Jian Tang
Recently, a variety of methods have been developed for this problem, which generally try to learn effective representations of users and items and then match items to users according to their representations.
Ranked #1 on Recommendation Systems on Last.FM
14 code implementations • 29 Oct 2018 • Weiping Song, Chence Shi, Zhiping Xiao, Zhijian Duan, Yewen Xu, Ming Zhang, Jian Tang
Afterwards, a multi-head self-attentive neural network with residual connections is proposed to explicitly model the feature interactions in the low-dimensional space.
Ranked #4 on Click-Through Rate Prediction on KKBox