Independent and Decentralized Learning in Markov Potential Games
We propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning dynamics, and analyze its convergence in infinite-horizon discounted Markov potential games. We focus on the independent and decentralized setting, where players do not have knowledge of the game model and cannot coordinate. In each stage, players update their estimate of Q-function that evaluates their total contingent payoff based on the realized one-stage reward in an asynchronous manner. Then, players independently update their policies by incorporating an optimal one-stage deviation strategy based on the estimated Q-function. A key feature of the learning dynamics is that the Q-function estimates are updated at a faster timescale than the policies. We prove that the policies induced by our learning dynamics converge to the set of stationary Nash equilibria in Markov potential games with probability 1. Our results highlight the efficacy of simple learning dynamics in reaching to the set of stationary Nash equilibrium even in environments with minimal information available.
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