Learning to Bid Without Knowing your Value

3 Nov 2017Zhe FengChara PodimataVasilis Syrgkanis

We address online learning in complex auction settings, such as sponsored search auctions, where the value of the bidder is unknown to her, evolving in an arbitrary manner and observed only if the bidder wins an allocation. We leverage the structure of the utility of the bidder and the partial feedback that bidders typically receive in auctions, in order to provide algorithms with regret rates against the best fixed bid in hindsight, that are exponentially faster in convergence in terms of dependence on the action space, than what would have been derived by applying a generic bandit algorithm and almost equivalent to what would have been achieved in the full information setting... (read more)

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