Network-Aware and Welfare-Maximizing Dynamic Pricing for Energy Sharing

3 Apr 2024  ·  Ahmed S. Alahmed, Guido Cavraro, Andrey Bernstein, Lang Tong ·

The proliferation of behind-the-meter (BTM) distributed energy resources (DER) within the electrical distribution network presents significant supply and demand flexibilities, but also introduces operational challenges such as voltage spikes and reverse power flows. In response, this paper proposes a network-aware dynamic pricing framework tailored for energy-sharing coalitions that aggregate small, but ubiquitous, BTM DER downstream of a distribution system operator's (DSO) revenue meter that adopts a generic net energy metering (NEM) tariff. By formulating a Stackelberg game between the energy-sharing market leader and its prosumers, we show that the dynamic pricing policy induces the prosumers toward a network-safe operation and decentrally maximizes the energy-sharing social welfare. The dynamic pricing mechanism involves a combination of a locational {\em ex-ante} dynamic price and an {\em ex-post} allocation, both of which are functions of the energy sharing's BTM DER. The {\em ex-post} allocation is proportionate to the price differential between the DSO NEM price and the energy sharing locational price. Simulation results using real DER data and the IEEE 13-bus test systems illustrate the dynamic nature of network-aware pricing at each bus, and its impact on voltage.

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