Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates

4 May 2017Yu ChengShaddin DughmiDavid Kempe

In light of the classic impossibility results of Arrow and Gibbard and Satterthwaite regarding voting with ordinal rules, there has been recent interest in characterizing how well common voting rules approximate the social optimum. In order to quantify the quality of approximation, it is natural to consider the candidates and voters as embedded within a common metric space, and to ask how much further the chosen candidate is from the population as compared to the socially optimal one... (read more)

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