Polynomial-Time Computation of Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Extensive-Form Games with Public Chance Moves and Beyond

9 Sep 2020Gabriele FarinaTuomas Sandholm

Unlike normal-form games, where correlated equilibria have been studied for more than 45 years, extensive-form correlation is still generally not well understood. Part of the reason for this gap is that the sequential nature of extensive-form games allows for a richness of behaviors and incentives that are not possible in normal-form settings... (read more)

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