Superrational types

5 Jan 2018  ·  Fernando Tohmé, Ignacio Viglizzo ·

We present a formal analysis of Douglas Hofstadter's concept of \emph{superrationality}. We start by defining superrationally justifiable actions, and study them in symmetric games... We then model the beliefs of the players, in a way that leads them to different choices than the usual assumption of rationality by restricting the range of conceivable choices. These beliefs are captured in the formal notion of \emph{type} drawn from epistemic game theory. The theory of coalgebras is used to frame type spaces and to account for the existence of some of them. We find conditions that guarantee superrational outcomes. read more

PDF Abstract
No code implementations yet. Submit your code now



  Add Datasets introduced or used in this paper

Results from the Paper

  Submit results from this paper to get state-of-the-art GitHub badges and help the community compare results to other papers.


No methods listed for this paper. Add relevant methods here