2 code implementations • 19 Dec 2017 • Erel Segal-haLevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders.
Computer Science and Game Theory
1 code implementation • 11 May 2017 • Erel Segal-haLevi
On the positive side, the paper proves that CE exists for almost all incomes when there are four goods and three agents with additive preferences.
Computer Science and Game Theory
2 code implementations • 8 Sep 2017 • Erel Segal-haLevi, Warut Suksompong
We introduce the concept of democratic fairness, which aims to satisfy a certain fraction of the agents in each group.
Computer Science and Game Theory
1 code implementation • 5 Aug 2019 • Fedor Sandomirskiy, Erel Segal-haLevi
We show that, for a generic instance of the problem (all instances except a zero-measure set of degenerate problems), a fair fractionally Pareto-optimal division with the smallest possible number of shared objects can be found in polynomial time, assuming that the number of agents is fixed.
Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
1 code implementation • 22 May 2017 • Erel Segal-haLevi, Haris Aziz, Avinatan Hassidim
We give a full characterization of allocations that are necessarily-proportional or possibly-proportional according to this assumption.
Computer Science and Game Theory
no code implementations • 16 Nov 2018 • Sophie Bade, Erel Segal-haLevi
We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete and transitive ranking.
no code implementations • 22 Jan 2023 • Erel Segal-haLevi, Warut Suksompong
Cake cutting is a classic fair division problem, with the cake serving as a metaphor for a heterogeneous divisible resource.
no code implementations • 17 May 2023 • Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-haLevi, Warut Suksompong
Charity is typically done either by individual donors, who donate money to the charities that they support, or by centralized organizations such as governments or municipalities, which collect the individual contributions and distribute them among a set of charities.
no code implementations • 24 Feb 2024 • Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-haLevi, Warut Suksompong
For the case of two alternatives, we extend existing results by proving that under very general assumptions, the uniform phantom mechanism is the only strategyproof mechanism that satisfies proportionality - a minimal notion of fairness introduced by Freeman et al. (2021).