Search Results for author: Eva Tardos

Found 7 papers, 0 papers with code

Adversarial Perturbations of Opinion Dynamics in Networks

no code implementations16 Mar 2020 Jason Gaitonde, Jon Kleinberg, Eva Tardos

We study the connections between network structure, opinion dynamics, and an adversary's power to artificially induce disagreements.

Data Structures and Algorithms Computer Science and Game Theory Social and Information Networks Physics and Society

Stability and Learning in Strategic Queuing Systems

no code implementations16 Mar 2020 Jason Gaitonde, Eva Tardos

In this paper, we study this phenomenon in the context of a game modeling queuing systems: routers compete for servers, where packets that do not get service will be resent at future rounds, resulting in a system where the number of packets at each round depends on the success of the routers in the previous rounds.

Feedback graph regret bounds for Thompson Sampling and UCB

no code implementations23 May 2019 Thodoris Lykouris, Eva Tardos, Drishti Wali

We study the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem with the graph-based feedback structure introduced by Mannor and Shamir.

Thompson Sampling

Small-loss bounds for online learning with partial information

no code implementations9 Nov 2017 Thodoris Lykouris, Karthik Sridharan, Eva Tardos

We develop a black-box approach for such problems where the learner observes as feedback only losses of a subset of the actions that includes the selected action.

Multi-Armed Bandits

The Price of Anarchy in Auctions

no code implementations26 Jul 2016 Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos

This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings.

Learning in Games: Robustness of Fast Convergence

no code implementations NeurIPS 2016 Dylan J. Foster, Zhiyuan Li, Thodoris Lykouris, Karthik Sridharan, Eva Tardos

We show that learning algorithms satisfying a $\textit{low approximate regret}$ property experience fast convergence to approximate optimality in a large class of repeated games.

No-Regret Learning in Bayesian Games

no code implementations NeurIPS 2015 Jason Hartline, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos

Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare.

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