no code implementations • 6 Jan 2022 • Lucas Pahl
We present an index theory of equilibria for extensive form games.
no code implementations • 2 Nov 2021 • Lucas Pahl
Under a correlated prior, the informed player faces the problem of how to optimally disclose information among two uninformed players in order to maximize his long-term average payoffs.
no code implementations • 2 Nov 2021 • Ivonne Callejas, Srihari Govindan, Lucas Pahl
Govindan and Klumpp [7] provided a characterization of perfect equilibria using Lexicographic Probability Systems (LPSs).
no code implementations • 28 May 2020 • Srihari Govindan, Rida Laraki, Lucas Pahl
Following the ideas laid out in Myerson (1996), Hofbauer (2000) defined a Nash equilibrium of a finite game as sustainable if it can be made the unique Nash equilibrium of a game obtained by deleting/adding a subset of the strategies that are inferior replies to it.
