no code implementations • 7 Sep 2023 • Koustav De, Harshil Mittal, Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra
We also present FPT approximation algorithms for Kemeny rank aggregation with respect to these parameters.
no code implementations • 24 Jul 2023 • Palash Dey, Sudeshna Kolay, Sipra Singh
That is, we assume that there exists a graph structure on the set of items of knapsack and the solution also needs to satisfy certain graph theoretic properties on top of knapsack constraints.
no code implementations • 28 Feb 2022 • Palash Dey, Debajyoti Kar, Swagato Sanyal
We complement this result by proving that any algorithm, from a natural class of algorithms, for predicting the winner in a district-based election when $r$ is plurality, must sample at least $\Omega\left(\frac{1}{\varepsilon^4}\log\frac{1}{\delta}\right)$ votes.
no code implementations • 9 Sep 2021 • Debajyoti Kar, Mert Kosan, Debmalya Mandal, Sourav Medya, Arlei Silva, Palash Dey, Swagato Sanyal
Ensuring fairness in machine learning algorithms is a challenging and essential task.
no code implementations • 3 Dec 2020 • Palash Dey, Arnab Maiti
In the Binary Networked Public Goods game, every player needs to decide if she participates in a public project whose utility is shared equally by the community.
Computer Science and Game Theory Computational Complexity Data Structures and Algorithms 68Q27
no code implementations • 25 Oct 2019 • Palash Dey, Sourav Medya
These similarity measures turn out to be an important fundamental tool for many real world applications such as link prediction in networks, recommender systems etc.
Social and Information Networks Data Structures and Algorithms
no code implementations • 7 Sep 2019 • Aditya Anand, Palash Dey
We show that {\em Distance Restricted Strong Manipulation} admits polynomial-time algorithms for every scoring rule, maximin, Bucklin, and simplified Bucklin voting rules for a single manipulator, and for the $k$-approval rule for any number of manipulators, but becomes intractable for the Copeland$^\alpha$ voting rule for every $\alpha\in[0, 1]$ even for a single manipulator.
no code implementations • 28 May 2019 • Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Swaprava Nath, Garima Shakya
We study the parameterized complexity of the optimal defense and optimal attack problems in voting.
no code implementations • 24 Feb 2019 • Palash Dey, Swaprava Nath, Garima Shakya
We further explore the effect of assuming that the {\em outlier} preferences/alternatives to be random (instead of arbitrary) on the sample complexity of the testing problem.
no code implementations • 25 Jan 2019 • Palash Dey
We consider three important measures of distances, namely, swap distance, footrule distance, and maximum displacement distance, and resolve the complexity of the optimal bribery problem for many common voting rules.
no code implementations • 23 Mar 2017 • Palash Dey
This thesis is in the area called computational social choice which is an intersection area of algorithms and social choice theory.
no code implementations • 28 Feb 2017 • Palash Dey, Nimrod Talmon, Otniel van Handel
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting rules; specifically, we consider the Approval-based and the Borda-based variants of both the Chamberlin-- ourant rule and the Monroe rule.
no code implementations • 18 Nov 2016 • Arnab Maiti, Palash Dey
We, in this paper, precisely study this problem for commonly used tournament solutions: given an oracle access to the edges of a tournament T, find $f(T)$ by querying as few edges as possible, for a tournament solution f. We first show that the set of Condorcet non-losers in a tournament can be found by querying $2n-\lfloor \log n \rfloor -2$ edges only and this is tight in the sense that every algorithm for finding the set of Condorcet non-losers needs to query at least $2n-\lfloor \log n \rfloor -2$ edges in the worst case, where $n$ is the number of vertices in the input tournament.
no code implementations • 13 Nov 2016 • Palash Dey
We also prove a lower bound of $\Omega(m^2\log n)$ on the number of queries that any algorithm needs to ask to elicit single crossing profile when random queries are allowed.
no code implementations • 15 Apr 2016 • Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra
The main contribution of our work is to provide polynomial time algorithms with low query complexity for preference elicitation in all the above six cases.
no code implementations • 15 Apr 2016 • Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra
We then investigate the query complexity for finding a weak Condorcet winner for preferences single peaked on a tree and show that this task has much less query complexity than preference elicitation.
no code implementations • 15 Apr 2016 • Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Opportunistic Manipulation (OM): the manipulators seek to vote in a way that makes their preferred candidate win in every viable extension of the partial votes of the non-manipulators.
no code implementations • 13 Nov 2015 • Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
For net approval and minisum approval voting rules, we provide a dichotomous result, resolving the parameterized complexity of this problem for all subsets of five natural parameters considered (by showing either FPT or W[1]-hardness for all subsets of parameters).
no code implementations • 19 Aug 2015 • Arnab Bhattacharyya, Palash Dey
We investigate the problem of winner determination from computational social choice theory in the data stream model.
no code implementations • 4 May 2015 • Palash Dey, Y. Narahari
The margin of victory of an election is a useful measure to capture the robustness of an election outcome.
no code implementations • 30 Apr 2015 • Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
The CM problem, however, has been studied only in the complete information setting, that is, when the manipulators know the votes of the non-manipulators.
no code implementations • 30 Apr 2015 • Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
However, the Frugal-{dollar}bribery problem is intractable for all the voting rules studied here barring the plurality and the veto voting rules for unweighted elections.